Introduction
This paper compares and analyzes cross-sectional and time-series characteristics of credit rating agency (CRA) ratings, implied impairment rate estimates and realized impairment rates of asset portfolio securitizations (also known as structured finance transactions). Three distinct hypotheses are analyzed, which provide empirical evidence on the role of ratings for securitizations during the global financial crisis (GFC) . 4 This is of highest importance as shortcomings may have been instrumental to past, current and future loss rates of investors in relation to structured finance transactions, which are generally called securitizations. Structured finance ratings and associated fee revenue have experienced an unprecedented growth in past years. Until the GFC, such ratings were also the dominant rating category -both in terms of numbers of ratings issued as well as CRA fee revenue.
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The GFC led to an unprecedented and unexpected increase of impairment rates for securitizations. The disappointment of investors resulted in the criticism of models applied by credit rating agencies (CRAs). Examples are VECTOR from Fitch (see Fitch Ratings (2006) ), CDOROM from Moody's (see Moody's Investors Service (2006) ) and CDO Evaluator from Standard and Poor's (see Standard and Poor's (2005) ). A similar critique was ventured after the Asian crisis of 1997 in relation to corporate bond issuer and bond issue credit ratings. For example, Leot et al (2008) find that ratings follow rather than predict the crisis as systematic downgrades occurred subsequent to the crisis. 1 Securitizations involve the sale of asset portfolios to bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicles, which are funded by investors of different seniorities (tranches). Based on the nature of the securitized asset portfolios, important transaction types include asset-backed securities (ABSs), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), home equity loan-backed securities (HELs) and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). Despite their name, securitizations are generally over-the-counter instruments. Information is available to measure the risk of securitizations and includes credit ratings, impairment histories and proxies for the asset portfolio risk, such as asset value indices or cash flow indices. The evaluation of individual risks, their dependence structure and derivatives is complicated by the low liquidity of the underlying assets, the unavailability of secondary markets and the recent origination of such transactions.
Two main streams exist in literature on the measurement of financial risks of securitizations and -with regard to the risk exposure -similar credit derivatives. The first stream focuses on the pricing, where the central issue is to explain observed (market) prices such as credit spreads of credit default swap indices. The most prominent examples are the CDX North America and iTraxx Europe indices, which reference the default events in relation to bond portfolios. These indices were originated in 2003 and 2004 . Credit spreads for the indices as well as tranches are generally available daily. Longstaff and Rajan (2008) and Hull and White (2004) apply a risk-neutral pricing framework to develop pricing techniques for these spreads. A central point of these risk models is the specification of the dependence structure for the portfolio assets.
The second stream is concerned with the modeling and estimation of risk characteristics of the underlying asset portfolio without relying on market prices. The focus is on the derivation of the distribution of future asset values (or losses) based on individual risk parameters. In the case of a loan portfolio, the relevant parameters are default probabilities, loss rates given default, exposures at default and dependence parameters such as correlations or more general copulas. Examples are as follows: Merton (1974) , Leland (1994) , Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) , Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) , Madan and Unal (1995) , Leland and Toft (1996) , Jarrow et al (1997) , Duffie and Singleton (1999) , Shumway (2001) , Carey and Hrycay (2001) , Crouhy et al (2001) , Koopman et al (2005) , McNeil and Wendin (2007) and Duffie et al (2007) address the default likelihood. Dietsch and Petey (2004) and McNeil and Wendin (2007) model the correlations between default events. Carey (1998) , Acharya et al (2007) , Pan and Singleton (2008) , Qi and Yang (2009) and Grunert and Weber (2009) develop economically motivated empirical models for recoveries using explanatory co-variables. Altman et al (2005) model correlations between default events and loss rates given default.
Within this stream, credit ratings are often used to explain credit risk. Ratings aim to measure the credit risk of corporate bond issuers, corporate bond issues, sovereigns and structured finance issues. In the contemporary climate of the GFC, the role and importance of ratings to all market participants (eg issuers, investors and regulators), while controversial, is acknowledged. Previous research focuses on the degree to which corporate credit rating changes introduce new information. For example, Radelet and Sachs (1998) find that rating changes are pro-cyclical. This suggests that they provide only a limited amount of new information to the market. Ederington and Goh (1993) , Dichev and Piotroski (2001) and Purda (2007) find that corporate credit rating downgrades provide news to the market. Loeffler (2004) finds that the default prediction power of ratings is low. Jorion et al (2005) show that after Regulation Fair Disclosure, the market impact of both downgrades and upgrades is significant and of greater magnitude compared to that observed in the preRegulation Fair Disclosure period. The relative roles of different CRAs have also been studied. For example, Miu and Ozdemir (2002) examine the effect of divergent Moody's and S&P's ratings of banks and Becker and Milbourn (2009) analyze the link between information efficiency of ratings and competition after the market entry of CRA Fitch.
With regard to the GFC, Rajan et al (2008) show that omission of soft information in ratings can lead to substantial model risk. Mayer et al (2008) find that the decline of housing prices was responsible for increasing sub-prime mortgage delinquency rates. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2008) analyze collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) rated by Standard and Poor's and find a mismatch between credit ratings and the quality of the underlying loan portfolios. Crouhy et al (2008) point out that CRAs' fee revenues depend on the number of ratings and may be linked to ratings quality. Similarly, Franke and Krahnen (2008) argue that incentive effects have played an important role in the GFC, particularly associated with the allocation of equity tranches of securitizations. Hull (2009) and Hellwig (2008) identify deficient CRA models as a cause of the GFC. Bolton et al (2008) show that the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk for CRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower during economic booms, which gives CRAs the incentive to understate credit risk in booms.
Unfortunately, the literature has not yet empirically analyzed CRA ratings of securitizations and their accuracy in explaining impairment risk. This may have been due to the complexity of securitizations and the limited availability of data through traditional data sources. Impairment risk is the risk of a securitization to violate contractual payment obligations. Impairment events are a good proxy for the likelihood that an investor in a securitization may experience a loss. 6 To date, investors and prudential regulators assume the existence of such a link by acknowledging CRAs and assigning risk premia and risk weights to CRA rating categories. This paper addresses the accuracy of CRA securitizations. Based on the rating and impairment data of one CRA, cross-sectional and time-series characteristics of ratings, implied impairment rate estimates and realized impairment rates of asset portfolio securitizations are compared and analyzed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the main hypotheses, consistent with the current literature in relation to the risk and uncertainty of CRA assessments. A framework to test the hypotheses is presented. Section 3 describes the data used in the study and analyzes three central hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the major ramifications of the empirical results for securitizations risk models and provides first suggestions in relation to a new stability framework for financial markets, institutions and instruments.
Hypotheses
The paper aims to answer empirically whether CRA structured finance ratings (from now on referenced as "ratings") are information efficient and may have been causal for the GFC. More specifically, information efficiency will be linked to i) the average impairment risk over time, ii) the impairment risk at and after origination and iii) the impairment risk given the economic cycle. Note that securitizations are generally structured as specific purpose companies which borrow from investors.
H1a addresses characteristics of the asset portfolio. Rajan et al (2008) find that securitization risk models omit "soft" information. This implies that CRA ratings, relying on such incomplete models omit important risk factors and hence misevaluate the average credit quality of the asset portfolio. Crouhy et al (2008) suggest that CRAs did not monitor raw data and were tardy in recognizing the implications of the declining state of the sub-prime market and support the argument by Rajan et al (2008) that other asset portfolio characteristics such as soft facts may be important drivers of asset portfolio risk.
H1b addresses the tranching structure of securitizations and the current discussion on the appropriate specification of the dependence structure of the asset portfolio, compare Hull (2009 ), Hellwig (2008 . The probability distribution and hence the percentiles of losses associated with the pool are particularly sensitive to the correlations in the underlying asset pool. Thus, the level of subordination may be a key driver and should explain tranche impairments after controlling for credit ratings if correlations are mis-specified in the CRA model.
Furthermore, the rating agencies may have an incentive to bias the measures of impairment risk. Crouhy et al (2008) argue generally that CRA fees are paid by issuers and that CRA competition is limited by regulation. This may imply that the credit quality measured by a CRA and CRA fee revenue is positively correlated. However, CRAs publish default and rating migration tables, which are used to calibrate ratings to metric risk measures. Thus, a systematic "rating for fee" policy would be noticed and priced by investors when analyzing the financial risk in relation to ratings. H2 addresses two potential ways in which rating agencies may circumvent this rating performance mechanism. Our Agency Incentive Hypotheses are:
H2a: Rating-implied impairment risk and time since origination are positively correlated.
H2b: Rating-implied impairment risk and rating intensity at origination are negatively correlated.
The first incentive problem (H2a) relates to the assumption that investors do not price the risk with regard to origination and monitoring years. Rating performance measures are generally calculated as an average per rating class. The fee revenue of rating agencies is high when the first rating is generated (origination year) and low in later years when ratings are revisited (monitoring years). Figure 1 shows the origination volume and outstanding volume of the analyzed tranches as well as the CRA fee revenue. 7 It is apparent and insightful that despite the fact that CRAs provide origination and monitoring ratings, CRA fee revenue corresponds with the origination volume rather than the outstanding volume.
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Please note that outstanding volume as well as fee revenue relate to origination years and monitoring years while the origination volume relates to origination years only. Figure 1 Origination volume, outstanding volume and CRA structured finance fee revenue This chart shows the origination volume, outstanding volume and structured finance fee revenue of the CRA Moody's Investors Service. Origination volume relates to the year starting from the time that a rating was first assigned. Origination volume has increased prior to the GFC and decreased during the GFC. Outstanding numbers relate to issues which are rated at the beginning of the year and hence are originated in prior years. Outstanding volume has increased during the whole observation period. Origination volume and structured finance fee revenues have increased prior to the GFC and decreased during the GFC. Therefore, structured finance fee revenue coincides more with the origination volume which is in line with the recognition of the majority of fee revenue at or shortly after origination by the CRA.
The reason for this finding is that origination fees exceed the monitoring fees in absolute terms. 8 In addition, the fees in relation to origination and monitoring years are often paid upfront despite their lagged recognition as accounting income. As a result, CRAs may have an incentive to assign i) too low risk ratings in origination years to increase fee revenue and ii) too high risk ratings in monitoring years to maintain stable default and rating migration performance measures. The hypothesis tests whether the underestimation of risk decreases over time since origination.
The second incentive problem (H2b) relates to a critique by Bolton et al (2008) who suggest that the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk for CRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower during economic booms, which gives CRAs the incentive to understate credit risk in economic booms. In financial year 2007, CRA Moody's Investors Service generated 77% of fee revenue for origination of ratings and 23% for monitoring of ratings. The empirical data suggests that 37% of structured finance ratings relate to an origination year and 63% of structured finance ratings relate to a monitoring year. These numbers imply that an origination rating generates approximately 5.7 times more fee revenue than monitoring a rating for one year.
visually by showing that the origination volume and thus fee volume is high in economic booms.
Hence H2b tests whether impairment risk is underestimated during periods of high securitization activity at origination.
H3 addresses the information degree of credit ratings and their ability to forecast impairment risk. Hellwig (2008) argues that the omission of systematic factors related to real estate prices such as interest rates and the availability of housing finance may have led to an overoptimism of valuations and ratings. Such expectations may be adjusted in an economic downturn. Consequently, credit ratings which are overoptimistic and do not account for all relevant risk factors are poor predictors for impairment risk. Thus our Prediction Hypothesis is:
H3: Ratings predict impairment risk.
Please note that the Impairment Risk Hypotheses H1a and H1b relate to idiosyncratic risk. The Agency Incentive Hypotheses H2a and H2b relate to incentive mechanisms induced by the fee structure for securitization ratings. The Prediction Hypothesis H3 relates to the interaction between idiosyncratic and systematic risk characteristics of securitizations.
Following the models in Gordy (2000) , Gordy (2003) , McNeil and Wendin (2007) , and Gupton et al (1997) , the attachment probability (ie the propensity of being exposed to a loss in the underlying asset pool) for a tranche i of transaction (or asset pool) j in period t
which implies that the tranche impairment probability is a function of the  Average portfolio asset quality it  ;  Asset correlation  ;  Attachment level of a tranche relative to the total deal principal ijt AL .
Please note that
Reasonable assumptions in this body of literature are the modeling of credit risk of an individual borrower by a Gaussian factor model for the individual asset return based on Merton (1974) as well as a large number of assets in the pool.
All three hypotheses test whether CRAs capture impairment risk accurately. If credit ratings correctly assess the impairment risk of a tranche, then the tranche impairment probability should solely be explained by the ratings.
The impairment of tranche
with observable information by the probit regression
where ijt  is a vector of tranche ratings at the beginning of an observation period.  is the respective vector of sensitivities and includes an intercept.
The models may be used for forecasting as the CRA ratings are measured at the beginning of the observation year. Note that the left hand side is the same probability as in equation (1). If ratings fully explain the impairment probability, then no other variable besides the ratings should be significant in the probit regression. In other words, if ratings reflect the tranche impairment probability accurately, they should include the information as specified in equation (1).
However, if a rating omits information, then additional information besides the rating may explain the tranche impairment probability. Examples may relate to the asset portfolio quality, the securitization structure as well as observable information about the business cycle.
Consider an error in assigning one or more of the pool parameters resulting in ijt ijt    which will lead to a bias in the estimated impairment probability. Then the impairment probability can be written as
with ijt ijt ijt     ~ denoting the measurement error in pool variables which may refer to characteristics of the pool, the tranche or time. Model (3) will provide the basis for the empirical tests in the following section.
Please note that this paper focuses on the ability of ratings and other risk factors to explain the (binary) impairment risk. Thus, the above probit analysis is appropriate to compare ratings and impairment events as it links the probability of impairment with explanatory variables. Krahnen and Weber (2001) argue that such a link is a necessity under generally accepted rating principles. These types of models have also been employed in other studies for analyzing corporate bond issue and issuer ratings or bank's loan credit ratings, compare eg Grunert et al (2005) . 
3.
Empirical analysis
Structured finance data
The paper analyzes a comprehensive panel data set of structured finance transactions rated by CRA Moody's Investors Service. The data covers characteristics of asset portfolios (which 9
The models were also estimated for robustness using only one tranche per pool to analyze the dependence between multiple tranches in relation to a single asset portfolio. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented.
are also known as collateral portfolios), characteristics of tranches, ratings of tranches as well as occurrences of impairment events of tranches. Alternative measures for rating performance may exist. Firstly, ratings may be compared to the performance of the asset portfolios. The approach may be reasonable for asset portfolios such as mortgage-backed securities where information on the default rates of the underlying portfolios is available. We chose not to follow this approach for two reasons. Firstly, we focus on the securitization market rather than mortgage-backed securities only and find distinct differences between various asset portfolios. Secondly, credit ratings are issued for individual securities (tranches) and a key element in credit ratings is the credit enhancement (subordination) of these securities.
Secondly, ratings may be compared to the propensity of occurrence of rating downgrades. We chose not to follow this approach as our research question aims to analyze the accuracy of credit ratings. Analyzing rating downgrades limits the interpretation of results as the link between downgrades and losses to investors is less transparent.
Structured finance transactions are very heterogeneous by definition. The authors are aware of potential prudential policy implications of the research project and applied the seven filter rules to generate a homogeneous data set. Hence, the following observations are deleted:
(1) Transaction observations which can not be placed into the categories ABS, CDO, CMBS, HEL or RMBS. These are mainly asset-backed commercial paper, structured covered bonds, catastrophe bonds, and derivative product companies. 22.0% of the original number of observations are deleted;
(2) Transaction observations where the monetary volume and therefore relative credit enhancement and thickness of individual tranches could not be determined without setting additional assumptions due to i) multiple currency tranches and ii) missing senior unfunded tranche characteristics. 13.5% of the original number of observations are deleted after the application of filter rule (1); (3) Transaction observations which are not based on the currency USD or transaction observations which are not originated in the USA. 5.0% of the original number of observations are deleted after the application of filter rule (1) and (2) The resulting data comprise 325,443 annual tranche observations. The number of impaired tranche observations is 13,072. 11 The data set is one of the most comprehensive data sets on securitization collected to date. Table 1 shows various proxies for origination 12 and outstanding volume of the data: number of tranches, number of deals and volume. In addition, rating fee revenues of the CRA Moody's Investors Service are shown. The outstanding number relates to issues which are rated at the beginning of the year and hence originated in prior years. Outstanding volume has increased during the whole observation period. Origination volume and structured finance fee revenues have increased prior to the GFC and decreased during the GFC. Therefore, structured finance fees coincide more with the origination volume which is in line with the recognition of the majority of fee revenue at or shortly after origination by the CRA. This table shows the Origination volume, outstanding volume and structured finance fee revenue of the CRA Moody's Investors Service. Origination numbers relate to the year starting from the time that a rating was first assigned. Origination numbers have increased prior to the GFC and decreased during the GFC. Outstanding numbers relate to issues which are rated at the beginning of the year and hence originated in prior years. Outstanding numbers have increased during the whole observation period. SF stands for structured finance (securitization) rating revenues and PPI stand for Public, Project & Infrastructure rating revenues. SF rating fee revenues have increased prior to the GFC and decreased during the GFC.
11 The original data set included 15,083 impairment events before the application of filtering rules.
12 Origination volume relates to the year starting from the time that a rating was first assigned. 13 Compare footnote 5.
From the resulting raw data, the following categorical variables were generated: Table 2 and Table 3 describe the number of observations over time. The overall number of rated securitizations has increased at an increasing rate over time.
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14 In the empirical analysis, the rating categories Aaa to A are aggregated to category Aaa-A due to the limited number of past impairment events in these categories. 15 In the empirical analysis, the categories RMBS and CMBS are aggregated to category MBS due to the limited number of past impairment events in these categories. 16 Alternative indicators of origination volumes such as the number of originated tranches or transactions were tested for robustness and resulted in similar results.
17 All tables weight individual transactions equally and similar observations may be made for the value of securitizations. Table 2 Total number of observations, relative frequencies of ratings at origination and at the beginning of the year This table shows the total number of observations and the relative frequencies of ratings at origination and at the beginning of the year. The panel data is based on securitizations rated by CRA Moody's Investors Service. The following observations were excluded: i) transaction observations which can not be placed into the categories asset-backed security, collateralized debt obligation, commercial mortgage-backed security, residential mortgage-backed security or home equity loan security; ii) transaction observations where the monetary volume and therefore relative credit enhancement and thickness of individual tranches could not be determined without setting additional assumptions; iii) transaction observations which are not based on the currency USD or transaction observations which are not originated in the USA; iv) tranche observations which relate to years prior to 1997 due to a limited number of observations, v) tranche observations which have experienced an impairment event in prior years. The number of rated tranches has increased at an increasing rate. The rating quality of rated tranches has generally decreased over time as a smaller fraction of tranches are rated Aaa. This table shows the total number of observations and the relative frequencies of asset portfolio and securitization characteristics. Asset portfolio characteristics are the asset portfolio category, the resecuritization status and the asset portfolio size. The asset portfolio categories are asset backed security (ABS), collateralized debt obligation (CDO), commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS), home equity loan security (HEL) and residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS). The resecuritization status indicates whether a transaction is a resecuritization of previous transactions or a primary securitization. The asset portfolio size is categorized into Small (inflation-adjusted asset portfolio size less than or equal to $500 million), Medium (asset portfolio size greater than $500 million and less than or equal to $1,000 million) and Big (asset portfolio size greater than $1,000 million). The number of rated tranches has increased at an increasing rate. The relative frequency of CDO and HEL has increased. The relative frequency of resecuritizations has generally decreased. The asset portfolio size has increased. Securitization characteristics are the subordination level, the thickness and the origination year. The subordination level Junior indicates that a tranche attaches between 0 and 5%, Mezzanine indicates that a tranche attaches between 5% and 30% and Senior indicates that a tranche attaches between 30% and 100%. The relative frequency of mezzanine and thin tranches has increased. Table 2 shows the relative frequency of rating categories at origination (Panel A) and at the beginning of the observation year (Panel B). In both panels, the average rating quality deteriorates over time as the relative frequency of the rating category Aaa declined. This may reflect i) a deterioration of the average asset portfolio quality, ii) a higher average risk level induced by the securitization structure (eg subordination, thickness or features such as embedded options, which are not addressed in this paper) or iii) a change of the CRA rating methodology. Table 3 shows the relative frequency of asset portfolio (Panel A) and securitization characteristics (Panel B). Asset portfolio characteristics are the asset portfolio category, the resecuritization status and the asset portfolio size. The asset portfolio categories are assetbacked security (ABS), collateralized debt obligation (CDO), commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS), home equity loan security (HEL) and residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS). The asset portfolio size is categorized into Small (asset portfolio size less than or equal to $500 million), Medium (asset portfolio size greater than $500 million and less than or equal to $1,000 million) and Big (asset portfolio size greater than $1,000 million).
The number of rated tranches has increased at an increasing rate. The relative frequency of CDO and HEL has increased. The relative frequency of resecuritizations has generally decreased. The inflation-adjusted asset portfolio size has increased. Securitization characteristics are the subordination level, thickness and origination year. The subordination level Junior indicates that a tranche attaches between 0% and 5%, Mezzanine indicates that a tranche attaches between 5% and 30% and Senior indicates that a tranche attaches between 30% and 100%.
The relative frequency of mezzanine and thin tranches has increased while the relative frequency of the various origination years (OY) depends on the origination as well as the maturity and impairment of securitizations.
Generally speaking, the validation of credit ratings is complicated as the use of ratings involves two steps: firstly the ordinal assessments of the financial risk of issuers or issues by CRAs and secondly the calibration of these ordinal ratings to metric credit risk measures such as default rates, loss rates given default or unconditional loss rates. This calibration step is generally opaque and investors rely on impairment rate tables which are periodically published by CRAs. These tables aggregate the impairment events over dimensions such as rating class or observation year. The data set enables the estimation of impairment risk based on the most detailed information level, ie the individual transaction in a given observation year. 18 While this number underlines the severity of the GFC and the importance of this study it raises the concern of imbalances in the data set. We address this issue for robustness by i) controlling for rating years, ii) analyzing the data for the period prior to the GFC and the GFC and iii) focusing on relative differences within these controlled environments. Table 4 shows the impairment rates for rating categories at origination (Panel A) and at the beginning of the observation year (Panel B). In both panels, the impairment rate increases for lower rating categories (ie from Aaa-A to Caa) and fluctuates over time with a dramatic increase during the GFC for all rating classes. The relative increase decreases during the GFC with the rating quality (ie from Caa to Aaa-A). Ironically, investors were most surprised by the increase of impairment rates of highly rated securitizations. Table 6 presents two probit models linking the impairment events with CRA ratings. Model 1 takes the dummy-coded ratings (reference category: Aaa-A) into account. Model 1 shows that CRA ratings explain the credit risk. As measures for in-sample accuracy of the models the Pseudo-2 R , re-scaled 2 R , and the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) are calculated (see Agresti (1984) ). 20 The parameter estimates increase from rating Aaa-A to rating Caa and are significant. This demonstrates that the ratings imply higher impairment risk from Aaa to Caa and that ratings explain impairment risk.
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H1 -Impairment risk hypotheses
Model 2 includes the ratings as well as the dummy-coded rating years (reference category: 1997). The rating years are significant which implies that the realized impairment rates differ between the years. This has been pointed out by previous studies on corporate ratings (compare eg Loeffler (2004) which conclude that ratings average the risk over the business cycle. 21 In other words, Model 2 shows that CRA ratings do not explain the increased level of impairment risk especially during economic downturns. We include rating year dummies in all subsequent models to control for this and further analyze the prediction quality of ratings in hypothesis H3. 19 Please note that inconsistencies may reflect the accuracy as well as the stochastic nature of impairment events. The latter is particularly relevant if the number of observations is low for a given category. One example is the impairment rates for the rating classes Ba (16.49%) and B (4.68%) in 2007 in Panel B of Table 4 . These inconsistencies are in line with reports by the data-providing CRA (compare Moody's Investors Service (2008)). 20 All measures are bounded between zero (lowest fit) and one (highest fit). 21 Such models are also known as through-the-cycle models. 
. Standard errors are in parentheses. The significance is indicated as follows: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. AUROC is the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (see Agresti (1984) ).
Model 1 shows that CRA ratings explain the credit risk over time. Model 2 shows that CRA ratings are unable to explain changes in the increased level of impairment risk over time. 
The inclusion of asset portfolio (Model 3 and 5) and securitization (Model 4 and 5) characteristics after controlling for credit rating and rating year explains impairment risk. The ramifications are that CRA ratings do not sufficiently account for the impairment risk stipulated by asset portfolio and securitization characteristics for given rating years. The division of the data into pre-GFC and GFC years shows that the asset portfolio characteristics (asset portfolio category, resecuritization status and deal size) are cyclical as the parameter sign changes while the securitization characteristics are not cyclical. CRAs are unable to measure both relationships. Table 7 confirms that the inclusion of asset portfolio (Model 3 and 5, Model 6 and 7) and securitization (Model 4 and 5, Model 6 and 7) characteristics after controlling for credit ratings add to the explanation of impairment risk. The ramifications are that CRA ratings do not sufficiently account for the average impairment risk stipulated by asset portfolio and securitization characteristics over time.
The split of the data into pre-GFC and GFC years shows that the asset portfolio characteristics (asset portfolio category, resecuritization status and deal size) are cyclical as the parameter sign changes while the securitization characteristics are not cyclical. Impairment risk is significantly lower (higher) for CDO, HEL, MBS, resecuritization and big deals before (during) the GFC than during (before) the GFC. Likewise, subordination and tranche thickness are negatively related to impairment risk and ratings are not able to explain this.
In summary, we reject the hypothesis H1a that ratings contain all information about the average asset quality of the asset portfolio relevant for impairment risk. In addition, we reject hypothesis H1b that ratings contain all information about the characteristics of securitizations relevant for impairment risk. CRAs do not take into account all the available asset portfolio and securitization information that is relevant to explaining impairment risk. The important ramifications are that i) CRAs may have to include such characteristics into the rating models or ii) users such as investors or prudential regulators should apply asset portfolio specific impairment rates to ratings when interpreting CRA ratings. 
H2 -Agency incentive hypotheses
Commercial CRAs may have a monetary incentive to bias the measures of impairment risk. The analyzed incentive hypotheses relate to the origination process during which a CRA may underestimate the risk in general (as fee revenue is high at origination) or during economic booms (as origination volumes and therefore fee revenue is high during economic booms).
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Model 8 in Table 8 shows that different origination years (also known as vintages) differ in risk. Models 9 and 10 24 show that ratings are unable to explain the risk of the different vintages.
Even more interestingly, Models 11 and 12 show that the vintage risk differs between the years prior to the GFC and during the GFC. During the GFC, the risk which is not reflected in ratings, increases for more recent origination and is highest for securitizations, which were originated immediately before the GFC. Vice versa, during years before the GFC, the risk which is not reflected in ratings decreases for more recent originations. 22 Despite the common use of ratings as metric risk measures, CRAs often claim to assess the relative risk, which essentially implies that a rating of a higher alphabetic order involves a lower level of financial risk. In an extension, all models were estimated controlling for the annual average impairment rate to ascertain that the findings relate to the absolute (calibration) as well as relative (discrimination) level of risk. The results are comparable to the ones reported in Tables 6 and 7 . 23 In addition, Bolton et al (2009) argue that investors are naive and reputational risk is low. 24 Model 10 controls for the rating year. Please note that the panel data set looks at origination and monitoring years, ie years between origination and maturity of securitizations. 
The risk of securitization differs for each origination year (OY) and CRAs are unable to measure this element. In addition, Model 11 and Model 12 show that the risk of recent origination years is high for the GFC and low for years prior to the GFC.
In order to test the hypotheses H2a and H2b, we replace the origination year dummies by the time since origination (TSO) and the securitization volume at origination (SVO). TSO is equal to one in the origination year and greater than one in monitoring years.
25 Table 9 The link between impairment risk,CRA ratings and incentive characteristics (cont.) All 
The first panel (all years) shows that the impairment risk given ratings (ie which is not explained by ratings) decreases with time since origination. This confirms that CRAs may have an incentive to assign i) too low risk ratings in origination years to increase fee revenue and ii) too high risk ratings in monitoring years to maintain stable default and rating migration performance measures. The second and third panel show that this effect is mainly driven by occurrence of the GFC. In addition, impairment risk given ratings increases with the securitization activity at origination. This result holds for all years, the years before and during the GFC. Table 9 shows that the negative parameter estimate (panel for all years) for the time since origination (TSO) implies that the level of impairment risk (given the rating) decreases over time. The relative fee revenue is high at origination and low thereafter. The implication is that the impairment risk given ratings (ie which is not explained by ratings) decreases over time. This confirms that CRAs may have an incentive to assign i) too low risk ratings in origination years to increase fee revenue and ii) too high risk ratings in monitoring years to maintain stable default and rating migration performance measures. The second and third panel show that this effect is mainly driven by the occurrence of the GFC. Thus we reject the hypothesis H2a that rating-implied impairment risk and time since origination are positively correlated.
In addition, a high securitization volume at origination (when absolute fee revenue is high) implies high impairment risk after controlling for rating. This result holds for the years before and during the GFC. Thus we reject the hypothesis H2b that rating-implied impairment risk and rating intensity at origination are negatively correlated.
Both hypothesis tests suggest that impairment risk is under-represented by ratings when fee revenue is high, which is the case at origination and during an economic boom when origination volume is high.
H3 -Prediction hypothesis
Ratings are generally applied as proxies for future impairment risk. The information content of corporate bond issue ratings has been analysed (compare, eg, Blume et al (1998) ). However, no evidence for CRA ratings on securitizations has been presented. Our previous results show that credit ratings do not include all relevant risk factors and are overoptimistic when fee revenue is high. Therefore we now check how this affects the ability for predicting future impairment risk.
The forecasting power of credit ratings is tested by an approach related to (Rajan et al (2008) ) which directly links ratings to future impairment risk. The approach proceeds in three steps.
Firstly, a probit regression is estimated for each year
where jit  are dummy variables for the ratings, which are observed at the beginning of the observation period. Next, the linear predictor for the subsequent year is calculated:
and the impairment probability prediction for the subsequent year
using the estimated coefficients  from Equation (4). Finally, the forecasting power is assessed by running a probit regression (Model 22).
We test for 0 0   and 1 1   , i.e., whether ratings provide perfect forecasts. As a robustness check a linear regression is estimated (Model 23):
so that    
Again, we test for 0 0   and 1 1   . All steps are repeated for each year from 1999 to 2008 where in the probit regression (4) all data up to year t are used. . The ramification is that CRA ratings do not predict impairment risk. Table 11 The link between realized and predicted impairment risk (linear regression) (1) (2) It can be seen that in most years, both coefficients of either regression are statistically significant and thus different from their ideal values (Columns 1 and 2) . Moreover, the respective 2 R s neither increase nor decrease throughout. This implies that the ratings quality has neither consistently declined nor improved. 26 While for most years, the evidence of underprediction or overprediction is mixed, particularly the downturn years 2002, 2007 and 2008 exhibit a significant underestimation of risk by the ratings. If ratings predict impairment risk accurately, they should have anticipated the downturns and should have downgraded the transactions accordingly. However, the observation that the estimates of 0  and 0  are greater than zero indicates that impairment risk has been under-predicted by the ratings in these years. In summary, the analysis shows that the rating quality has neither consistently declined nor improved through time. In other words, there has been a mix of years of overprediction and years of underprediction of impairment risk. This indicates that CRA ratings have a limited ability to predict impairment risk.
In summary, we reject the hypothesis H3 that ratings predict impairment risk. The ramifications are that CRAs are poor predictors for impairment risk and that investors relying on predictions of future levels of impairment risk may have to build private models.
27
Alternatively, CRAs may adjust their ratings by a projection of the future state of the economy. This may be accomplished by including time-lagged variables of the level and change of the total impairment rate.
Discussion and outlook
To date, empirical evidence on the accuracy of ratings and risk models for securitizations is limited. The article's main objective is to analyze the impact of idiosyncratic and systematic risk characteristics on impairment risk of securitizations.
The most substantial findings are that CRA ratings for securitizations  Do not fully account for the average credit quality in asset portfolios;  Do not fully account for the structure of asset securitizations;  Measure a too low impairment risk level at origination when fee revenue is high;  Measure a too low impairment risk level if a securitization was originated in a high securitization activity year;  Are unable to predict impairment risk.
CRA ratings (like many other commercial vendor solutions) may have to be interpreted in relation to the invested resources. Please note that the major CRAs cover a large number of rated debt issuers and issues per year 28 with a limited number of financial analysts. 29 This paper has also shown that ratings are informative with regard to the average idiosyncratic impairment risk over the business cycle.
There may be various ways to address the findings of this paper, which may include the knowledge transfer to the financial system (ie to CRAs and CRA rating users), independence between CRA fee revenue and origination process, cap for CRA fee revenues or introduction 26 A comparison of 2 R should be carefully interpreted as each year has a different number of observations.
Please also note that our definition of rating quality differs from the definition of rating standard by Blume et al (1998) , compare Footnote 10. 27 The results confirm the findings by Loeffler (2004) of minimum standards on resources spent on ratings. A public discussion is needed to transfer the findings into regulatory policy.
To date, CRAs have usually made available to the general public histories of their financial risk measures as well as the respective realizations. Little is known of the quality of models of other vendors as well as financial institution internal models as the respective information is kept private. However, recent negative earnings announcements from financial institutions suggest that other models applied in industry may share similar properties. Therefore, a formal validation of such models is important.
